Converging evidence has led to a consensus in favor of computational models of behavior implementing continuous information flow and parallel processing between cognitive processing stages. Yet, such models still typically implement a discrete step between the last cognitive stage and motor implementation. This discrete step is implemented as a fixed decision bound that activation in the last cognitive stage needs to cross before action can be initiated. Such an implementation is questionable as it cannot account for two important features of behavior. First, it does not allow to select an action while withholding it until the moment is appropriate for executing it. Second, it cannot account for recent evidence that cognition is not confined prior to movement initiation, but consistently leaks into movement. To address these two features, we propose a novel neurocomputational model of cognitionaction interactions, namely the unfolding action model (UAM). Crucially, the model implements adaptive information flow between the last cognitive processing stage and motor implementation. We show that the UAM addresses the two abovementioned features. Empirically, the UAM accounts for traditional response time data, including positively skewed initiation time distribution, functionally fixed decision bounds and speed-accuracy trade-offs in button-press experimental designs. Moreover, it accounts for movement times, movement paths, and how they are influenced by cognitive-experimental manipulations. This move should close the current gap between abstract decision-making models and behavior observed in natural habitats.
Humans rely on their ability to select relevant actions in order to survive. For instance, some indigenous tribes rely on precise hunting techniques such as spear fishing to feed. When multiple preys are afforded by the environment, spear fishing constitutes an action selection problem. Understanding the underlying cognitive processes and neural mechanisms involved in resolving this selection problem has been the attentional focus of cognitive (neuro) science and psychology of decision-making for more than four decades. To that endeavor, scientists have proposed a wide variety of computational models in distinct research domains such as language (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005) , numerical cognition (Dotan & Dehaene, 2016) , reinforcement learning (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005) , working memory (Oberauer, Souza, Druey, & Gade, 2013) , semantic processing (Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2017) , metacognition (Fleming & Daw, 2017) , and cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) , to cite but a few. In the following, we briefly review the theoretical and architectural evolution of such computational models. Subsequently, we point out a cognition-action gap that is problematic in such models. Finally, we propose a novel computational model overcoming this issue while still accounting for the most prominent behavioral features accounted for by previous models.
Strict Serial Processing
Perhaps the first explicit model architecture for cognitive processing was proposed in the pioneer work of Donders (1868 Donders ( , 1969 . The author assumed that there are distinct, sequentially activated, information processing stages between perceiving a stimulus and producing a response. In this model, the output of one processing stage is taken as the input to the next, without any temporal overlap between the two stages. This process continues until a response is selected and implemented. Donders also devised a method to test (properties of) this strict serial stage model. In particular, his subtractive method allowed him to calculate the time needed for specific processing stages. Consider two tasks differing in only one processing stage. A first task involves pressing a button with the right index whenever the letter "i" appears in a flow of sequentially presented letters. A second task involves pressing a button with the right and left index whenever the letter "i" and "e" appear, respectively. Arguably, the second task contains an additional action selection processing stage compared to the first task. Hence, by subtracting the time associated to the first task from that of the second task, Donders suggested one could compute the time associated to the additional processing stage (i.e., action selection).
The subtractive method came under criticism. It seemed inconceivable to design experimental tasks that would uniquely add or remove a specific processing stage without influencing the other processing stages. Following the same serial architecture, Sternberg suggested an alternative approach, the additive method, to investigate the components of the strict serial stage model (Sternberg, 1969) . He proposed that when experimental factors only target a specific processing stage (rather than influencing several ones), their effects on reaction times (RTs) would be independent and additive. Sternberg's approach had the advantage that it did not require adding or removing specific components (stages) in the serial processing stream.
The strict serial stage information processing model and accompanying additive method were soon applied in several areas of cognition including reading (McCusker, Gough, & Bias, 1981) , memory (Sternberg, 1966) , problem solving (Simon & Newell, 1971) , numerical cognition (Capaldi & Miller, 1988) , and vision (Marr, 1976) . For instance, early work in reading (e.g., Gough, 1972) suggested that each letter would be separately and serially encoded into phonemes. Once encoded, these phonemes would then be tied together to form individual words. The idea of cutting up general information in different pieces to be independently and serially processed was translated to brain functioning as well. A modular view of the brain was developed where each processing stage/module within a serial processing stream would be subtended by a distinct brain area (e.g., Fodor, 1983) . Broadly speaking, perceptive processes would be subtended in visual occipital areas, cognitive processes in high-order associative cortices (i.e., frontoparietal networks), and the output of the final cognitive stage (e.g., action selection), would be sent to the motor areas, which execute the action (Keele, 1968; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) .
In sum, strict serial processing is encapsulated by two main features. First, seriality: processing stages are arranged in a chain. Second, thresholding: a processing stage needs to be completed before the subsequent stage starts. A cornerstone argument in favor of a processing architecture implementing these two features emanates from the seminal serial search paradigm. In this paradigm, participants have to report whether a target symbol is present in a previously memorized sequence of symbols. Typically, mean RT linearly increase as a function of the sequence length (e.g., Sternberg, 1966) . It was concluded that only a model architecture composed of serially arranged comparison processing stages (i.e., seriality), whereby each symbol in the memorized sequence is compared to the target symbol one at a time (i.e., thresholding), could explain such a linear RT function.
Computational Advances and Alternative Accounts
The strict serial stage model was soon criticized by two main novel processing insights. First, instead of implementing thresholding between the distinct processing stages, it was suggested that information may directly leak from each stage to the subsequent one in the serial chain. Such a continuous flow is at the heart of the cascade model of McClelland (1979) . In particular, that model suggests that every processing unit belonging to a specific stage continuously feeds information to the processing unit(s) it is connected to in the subsequent stage. The connections from the penultimate cognitive stage project to a final cognitive stage where two (or more) responses, corresponding to each potential choice in the task at hand, compete for being executed by the subsequent motor stage. Importantly, McClelland (1979) demonstrated that the additive logic of Sternberg (1969) could be applied under specific circumstances to networks arranged in cascade. This type of information processing was also suggested by Eriksen and Schultz (1979) to take place in visual search tasks, and was designated as a continuous flow conception.
Second, an even more compelling blow to serial stage processing followed directly on the serial search paradigm. In particular, rigorous mathematical theorems proved that limited capacity parallel processing models were not only perfectly able to mimic the linear RT curves suggested to stem from serial processing, but also systematically provided better fit to the data (Townsend, 1972 (Townsend, , 1976 (Townsend, , 1981 . Further work (Townsend, 1990 ) also discussed the importance of disentangling between serial and parallel processing, and proposed different methods to do that.
The architecture debate was born and, based on these computational advancements, novel models saw the light. Broadly speaking the resulting models can be situated on a two-dimensional space where the first dimension, the information flow dimension, defines whether the information flow between stages is continuous or thresholded; and the second dimension, the architecture dimension, defines whether the processing stages are arranged in serial chain or in parallel. For instance, in the seminal work of Quillian (1967 Quillian ( , 1969 semantic processing results from automatic spreading activation between processing units, each coding for one concept, that form an interconnected (i.e., not serially chained) network. Here, the concept represented by a specific unit is not fully processed when activation is passed to another unit (representing another concept). Thereby, such a model would be defined by continuous information flow and parallel processing stages (also see Collins & Loftus, 1975) .
Consensus and Remaining Issues
Influential models have been associated to distinct locations in this two-dimensional space. Nonetheless, a consensus has graduThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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ally been reached in favor of models implementing both continuous information flow and a parallel architecture. These models have found support in studies using neurophysiological as well as imaging techniques. Supporting parallel architecture, single-cell recording studies in nonhuman primates have consistently shown that processing channels representing each potential action in the task at hand are activated in parallel (Cisek, 2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005; Klaes, Westendorff, Chakrabarti, & Gail, 2011) . Supporting continuous information flow, using magnetoencephalography (MEG), it has been shown that the competition between potential action plans in a perceptual decision task is biased from the very beginning all the way up to the primary motor cortex (e.g., Donner, Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009) . Furthermore, several studies have shown that representations of potential action plans in (pre)motor cortices (Bastian, Schöner, & Riehle, 2003; Michelet, Duncan, & Cisek, 2010; Thura & Cisek, 2014) , are biased by decision variables such as reward from the very beginning of the decision process (Lauwereyns, Watanabe, Coe, & Hikosaka, 2002) . However, despite their advantages, current models have two questionable properties in common. First, information flow from one stage to another is typically nonadaptive. Note that this is the case both for continuous (e.g., cascade model) and thresholded information flow (e.g., serial stage model) systems. Continuous information flow corresponds to a zero threshold, and thresholded information flow corresponds to a nonzero, but constant threshold value. This property will from now on be called unadaptive information flow. Hence, these models do not allow for an adaptive information flow between processing stages. Yet, this is essential for optimal functioning. Consider again the spear fishing action selection problem. It is key for a successful spear shooter to withhold the action until the moment is optimal to hit the prey. This implies a system that can select an action but withhold it if the moment is not optimal, that is, separating what action to select from when to execute it. Hence, we propose to add a third level to the information flow dimension, namely adaptive information flow. This level allows implementing a break on a continuous flow of information, thereby loading cognitive information and releasing it upon the optimal moment (i.e., separating what to do from when to do it).
Second, current models typically assume that information flow between the final cognitive and the motor stage is thresholded, that is, action is only initiated when cognition is fully finished. This property, from now on called cognition-action thresholding, is present in all models discussed up to now. Cognition-action thresholding is implemented also in the cascade model (cfr. Figure 1 in McClelland, 1979) , and has been repeatedly implemented in more recent continuous information flow models in distinct domains such as, numerical cognition (Gevers, Verguts, Reynvoet, Caessens, & Fias, 2006) , cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001) , task switching (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002) , and task set learning and generalization (Collins & Frank, 2013) . Moreover, cognitionaction thresholding is also a key feature in accumulation-to-bound models (Cisek, Puskas, & El-Murr, 2009; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) , where action is initiated only when evidence in favor of a specific response reaches a (fixed or collapsing) decision threshold.
One reason why cognition-action thresholding has been implemented even in continuous information flow models is that such thresholding has received support from neurophysiological studies. In monkeys, the firing rate of motor neurons encoding for potential actions reaches a fixed rate at the moment of the decision, irrespective of task difficulty, which is suggestive of cognitionaction thresholding (Gold & Shadlen, 2007 ; see also Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Schall & Bichot, 1998; Thura & Cisek, 2014) . In humans, Twomey, Murphy, Kelly, and O'Connell (2015) reported that the P300 (an event-related EEG potential peaking around 300 ms-600 ms after task-relevant stimulus onset) reaches a fixed amplitude just prior to response execution, again irrespective of task difficulty (see also Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O'Connell, 2015; O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012) . However, cognition-action thresholding seems incompatible with recent theoretical accounts, based on extensive behavioral and neurophysiological evidence (see below), suggesting that behavior stems from a continuous information flow involving perceptual, cognitive and motor processes (e.g., Magnuson, 2005) . Indeed, by definition, cognition-action thresholding impeaches cognitive processes and motor processes to overlap in time. Computational models should be able to account for those effects of cognition on ongoing actions. Interestingly, as described later on, adaptive information flow between the final cognitive and the motor stage has the potential to account both for the emergence of thresholded information flow between cognition and action, as well as the continuous overlap between cognitive and motor processes.
Neural and Behavioral Evidence Supporting Adaptive Information Flow and Temporal Overlap Between Cognition and Action
Adaptive information flow would implement a brake on the information processing flow in order to separate what action to perform from when to perform it, or more generally, for allowing information to flow from one stage to another at the right time. Interestingly, recent studies suggest that adaptive information flow may be supported by the subthalamic nucleus (STN; Frank, 2006; Weintraub & Zaghloul, 2013) . For instance, rats with STN lesions have difficulties estimating when to perform a relevant action and thereby display compulsive lever-pressing for reward (Winter et al., 2008) . Moreover, lesions to the STN induce premature responding (Baunez et al., 2001; Baunez & Robbins, 1997) . Deep brain stimulation (DBS) in STN increases speed and decreases accuracy in tasks inducing choice conflict (e.g., Stroop Task; Jahanshahi et al., 2000) . Also with DBS, Cavanagh et al. (2011) showed that when stimulating the STN (disrupting its functional role), patients with Parkinson's disease displayed impulsive choices in highly conflictual situations. In the same vein, using fMRI and a stop-signal task, Aron and Poldrack (2006) observed that successful stops significantly activated the STN. Altogether, these studies suggest that the STN may implement a break on information flow in order for the system to resolve response conflict prior to allowing information to flow in the subsequent motor stage. Importantly, the STN receives anatomical inputs from several motor areas (directly from primary motor cortex, Alexander & Crutcher, 1990 ; indirectly from preSMA; Aron et al., 2007) . Furthermore, it projects back to motor areas (via pallidum and thalamus). Therefore, STN might pick up (pre-)motor cortex signals in order to gate motor cortex in a negative feedback loop, thus This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
separating what to do from when to do it (i.e., implementing adaptive information flow). This is known as the STN hypothesis (Forstmann et al., 2010) . We further suggest that cognitive and motor processes overlap in time. Such a proposal is supported by several reaching task studies providing novel insights into the information processing nature of the final processing stages. For instance, action selection (cognitive) processes are not confined prior to movement initiation (action) but rather continuously influence motor processes, thereby suggesting parallel activation between cognitive and motor processes (Boulenger et al., 2006; Calderon, Dewulf, Gevers, & Verguts, 2017; Calderon, Verguts, & Gevers, 2015; Chapman et al., 2010; Cressman, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2007; Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; Santens, Goossens, & Verguts, 2011; Sullivan, Hutcherson, Harris, & Rangel, 2015) . For instance, Chapman and colleagues (2010) observed that reach trajectories are more attracted toward the side of a display when it contains more potential targets compared with the opposite side. This reach trajectory attraction bias is suggested to stem from an unbalance (in favor of the side containing more potential targets) of simultaneously activate reach plans.
Implementing Adaptive Information Flow
Both questionable properties raised above (i.e., unadaptive information flow and cognition-action thresholding) can be dealt with by implementing adaptive information flow between the last cognitive and motor stage. With this in mind, we developed a neurocomputational model of cognition-action interactions. In the initial phases of cognitive processing, the model inhibits actions depending on contextual constraints. Actions do not start when activity crosses a fixed threshold: Rather, actions start to be implemented once a dynamically modifiable inhibition level is sufficiently surpassed. Thus, the issue associated with unadaptive information flow (i.e., separating what to do from when to do it) is addressed. When this dynamic threshold is crossed, no "motor stage" is initiated; cognitive processing simply continues, but it now has motor consequences. Thus, the issue of cognition-action thresholding (i.e., cognition leaks into action) is addressed.
The model is illustrated in three simulations. In Simulation 1, we consider model performance in the most widely used task to study decision making models, namely the two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task. The model can account for the typical behavioral results such as RT distributions and speed-accuracy tradeoffs (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010) . We further show that our model (implementing adaptive information flow between the last cognitive and the motor stage) accounts for data that was interpreted as favoring thresholded information flow (i.e., fixed decision bound) between cognition and action. To strengthen this point we extract parameters from the drift diffusion model (DDM; Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008) on the simulated data in order to interpret the model's functioning. In Simulation 2, we demonstrate that our model can account for the effects of cognition on unfolding actions. Specifically, we show that our model can account for the initiation times (ITs), movement times (MTs), and movement paths in reaching tasks (e.g., Calderon et al., 2015) . In Simulation 3, we generalize the effect of a cognitive manipulation to a completely different domain, namely numerical cognition (Santens et al., 2011) .
The Unfolding Action Model (UAM)
The UAM architecture is illustrated in Figure 1A . An input layer projects to dorsal premotor cortex (PMd). The latter currently consists of two response options (left [L] and right [R] target direction), in line with the experiments we will model. In turn, the PMd layer has ipsilateral excitatory connections with the primary motor (M1) layer. Competition between reach target directions is implemented within both the PMd and M1 layer through lateral inhibition (e.g., Duque et al., 2007) . Hence, our model displays a parallel architecture instantiated by two parallel processing channels representing two concurrent potential action plans. Each processing channel is composed of distinct processing stages. The M1 layer projects to a movement vector layer (presumably located in brainstem or spine; see General Discussion section); and movement trajectory is implemented as a continuously updated M1-activity-weighted vector addition ( Figure 1A ). Finally, M1 also projects to the STN (Alexander & Crutcher, 1990) , implementing a negative feedback loop for M1. In particular, STN functions as an adaptive gate for movement execution that is modified online depending on M1 dynamics. Specifically, as the activation difference between M1 processing units increases, so does the width of the movement execution gate (see Figure 1B , C). Hence, information flow is continuous up until M1. However, information flow between M1 (i.e., the last cognitive stage) and motor stage is adaptive; and this adaptive information flow is gated by the STN. Full mathematical implementation of the UAM (and biological motivation) can be found in Appendix A.
Simulation 1: Decision Making
The movement vectors can be chosen such as to implement any desired task-specific movement parameters (see Method section below). A straightforward example would be a button press task: In the current framework, a button press task is just a task requiring short movement vectors. We thus start our simulation series by investigating whether the UAM accounts for extant data in the staple of experimental psychology, the two-alternative forcedchoice (2AFC) task of decision making. Specifically, two model aspects were investigated in this simulation. The first is positive skew. RTs virtually always have a positively skewed distribution (Luce, 1986) . This is therefore a first feature that any plausible model of RTs (or ITs) must adhere to. Second, faster RT often comes with an accuracy cost. This effect is known as the speedaccuracy trade-off (SAT; Bogacz et al., 2010) . Depending on the environmental constraints, agents can optimally set this tradeoff to either emphasize speed or accuracy (Heitz, 2014) . We thus also investigated whether the UAM accounts for SAT. For this purpose, two data sets were simulated, one with a high (emphasizing accuracy) and one with a low (emphasizing speed) STN initial value ( Figure 2C ). As extensively described below, our adaptive information flow implementation also explains the emergence of thresholded information flow (i.e., fixed decision bound). Specifically, modifying the STN initial value has a direct influence on adaptive information flow, and thereby on the emergence of thresholded information flow. A high STN initial value will induce a conservative information flow threshold (high decision bound), that will in turn induce slow but accurate RTs. Conversely, a low STN initial value will induce a low information flow threshold (low decision bound), that will in turn induce fast but error prone RTs. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Method
Design. We simulate a generic 2AFC task where Stimulus 1 and 2 require a left and a right button press, respectively (see Figure 2A ). Examples of stimuli would be arrows pointing left or right (Boy, Husain, & Sumner, 2010) , random dots moving left or right (Shadlen & Newsome, 2001) , or words and nonwords (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) . Stimulus 1 and 2 activate input unit 1 and 2, respectively, which then activate PMd. Errors in simulated ITs occur when the activity of the irrelevant M1 unit displays a higher activity than the relevant M1 unit once a response is given. Depending on the stimulus (i.e., left or right arrow), one specific input unit was active at a time (x i ϭ 1).
Data analysis. Two data sets of 4,000 trials were simulated (2,000 for each stimulus) for each condition (i.e., emphasizing speed or accuracy). Parameter values are displayed in the Appendix B. To test for positive skew, we plotted the IT distributions and calculated Pearson's moment coefficient of skewness (␥) for each simulated data set. A value of 0 indicates a perfectly symmetrical distribution, a negative value indicates a negative skew distribution, and a positive value indicates positive skew. To test for the SAT, the accuracy in each simulated data set was calculated and their IT distributions were plotted.
To further investigate the role of STN functionality in our model, we fitted the diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978) to the simulation data. The DDM explains performance in 2AFC tasks through a sequential evidence accumulation process over time. Of specific interest are two parameters of the DDM, namely the decision bound a and the drift rate v. The decision bound defines how much evidence is needed to make a choice, and the drift rate defines the speed of evidence accumulation. We reasoned that because the STN gates action execution (i.e., choice implementation), ITs simulated with two distinct STN initial levels should best be accounted for by a DDM allowing the decision bound to vary freely across conditions. We therefore tested four models (all combinations of a and v free or fixed) using the Diffusion Model Analysis Toolbox (DMAT; Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx, 2008) .
Response implementation. Movement is implemented through a M1-activity-weighted vector addition. Specifically, the vector associated to a left response (i.e., v 1 When activation increases in a unit relative to the other (i.e., when the biased competition favors a particular action plan, here the left movement plan), the STN value decreases and it inhibits less, to the point that movement is gradually released. LT ϭ left target; RT ϭ right target. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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where z represents the activity of M1 units (see Appendix A). Thus, from an UAM perspective, a button press can be considered as a movement with small absolute size. The ITs were computed as the time interval between the input onset of the go signal and the moment that the vertical-dimension value of the movement (V) vector was Ͼ1.
Results Figure 2B shows the IT distributions of the two simulated data sets, one emphasizing speed (blue) and the other accuracy (red); here and elsewhere, (initiation) time is measured in arbitrary units (a.u.). Both distributions have a positive skew, and skewness is enhanced in the speed-emphasis condition (␥ ϭ 1.29) relative to the accuracy-emphasis condition (␥ ϭ 0.77).
Second, the model with higher initial STN was indeed more accurate than with lower initial STN (93% and 75%, respectively), but slower (mean RT .77 and .41, respectively). Thus, the model implements speed-accuracy trade-off (SAT). This is further illustrated in Table 1 , which shows the results (parameter estimates of a and v, and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) of the DDM fitting procedure for the four models considered above. Note that BIC automatically incorporates the effects of both fit and model complexity. The worst model is the one where no parameters are allowed to change across conditions. Second is the model where only drift rates can change. As predicted, the two best models are the ones where boundaries can change. Unexpectedly, the model with both free decision bound and free drift rate is the best of all. However, the free drift rate in the latter model is misleading because the drift rate estimates are in the opposite direction as predicted. One would expect the drift rate to increase when speed is emphasized; in contrast, the drift rate decreased when speed was emphasized. The decision bounds are in the expected direction: Decision bound is lower when speed is emphasized. Altogether, these results demonstrate that STN in our model approximates the DDM decision bound. This implies that the adaptive information flow instantiated in our model between M1 processing stages and motor implementation is a mechanism that can account for a large corpus of neurophysiological studies (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Twomey et al., 2015) that have until now been taken as evidence for thresholded information flow in the last processing stage.
Discussion
The UAM exhibits two classical RT effects, namely positive skew and SAT. To understand why the model exhibits these effects, consider a cartoon of the model dynamics in Figure 2C , the blue lines in particular. Descending lines correspond to STN and ascending lines to the response-relevant motor processing unit. Each pair of touching lines (touching at the blue horizontal line) corresponds to a specific trial. The slopes of the ascending lines represent evidence strength for the relevant response. Steepness is subject to trial-by-trial variance, and when the slopes are steep, evidence in favor of the relevant response is strong. First, the geometric intuition explains why skew must be positive; there is simply more "room" for lines to cross on the right than on the left. Second, it's also clear from Figure 2C how the model can account for the SAT: By increasing the initial value of STN (red lines in Figure 2C ), response and STN trajectories cross later, and this slows RT, increases accuracy, and decreases positive skew.
Adaptive information flow implementation also explains the emergence of thresholded information flow (i.e., fixed decision bound; see Gold & Shadlen, 2007) . Let us focus on a given accuracy context (e.g., red lines in Figure 2C ). In the UAM, the value of the STN linearly decreases (red descending lines) as a function of M1 unit activation (red ascending lines). In particular, a steep evidence accumulation increase (e.g., easy task with strong motion coherence) induces a steep STN value decrease. It follows that, for any given trial difficulty, the ascending and descending lines will cross around the same location on the ordinate, and therefore action initiation will begin once motor evidence accumulation reaches a specific value (red horizontal line; i.e., the action initiation threshold). This is true for any given STN initial value (see blue horizontal line in Figure 2C ).
Simulation 2: Cognitive Control
To address both the leakage of cognitive processes into movement and the emergence of a fixed decision bound, we next consider a task where movement paths (MPs) can be studied. For this purpose, we used the reaching task of Calderon et al. (2015) . In this task, participants had to reach toward the correct response target side (see Figure 3) . Task difficulty was defined by a cuetarget congruency; the cue could point in the same direction as the target (congruent, easy trial) or in the opposite direction (incongruent, difficult trial). It was found that the difficulty manipulation was observed both in ITs, as well as in the MTs and MPs. Hence, these results are in line with the view that cognitive processes influence motor processes after movement initiation (i.e., cognition leaking into movement). First, we test whether the UAM can also account for the difficulty manipulation not only at the level of ITs, but also MTs and MPs. Furthermore, the difficulty manipulation allows us to consider again, from an adaptive information flow perspective, the emergence of a fixed decision bound. Note. a ϭ decision bound level; v ϭ drift rate; STN low ϭ initial level of the subthalamic nucleus of .5; STN high ϭ initial level of the subthalamic nucleus of 1.2; DDM ϭ drift diffusion model; BIC ϭ Bayesian Information Criterion. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
As previously mentioned, EEG markers of sensorimotor activity (i.e., the amplitude of the P300 ERP) reached a fixed threshold regardless of trial difficulty (O'Connell et al., 2012) . Second, we thus test whether this property also holds in the UAM.
Method
Design. Each trial started with a predictive cue regarding upcoming reach possibilities, before the target stimulus. Cues could either be congruent or incongruent with the upcoming target direction. Also, this cue-target congruency could either be of high probability (80%) or low probability (60%). ITs were computed as the time between the onset of the go signal (indicating which target to reach for) and the first data point falling outside a small start square location (that needed to be touched to start the trial). MTs were defined as the time interval between leaving the start location and reaching the target location. Therefore, our experimental data conformed to a 2 (cue-target congruency; Congruent or Incongruent) ϫ 2 (Probability; high or low) design; and for each cell we had an IT and MT. This provided us eight response time measures. Moreover, MPs corresponded to the horizontal and vertical locations of the movement during the MT. We predicted that task difficulty (implemented via the predictive task-relevant cues) would be revealed in ITs, MTs, and MPs (for details see Calderon et al., 2015) .
We simulated 4,000 trials with an identical trial distribution as in Calderon et al. (2015) . To match the sample size of Calderon et al. (2015) we simulated the MPs for 20 simulated participants. Input unit weights w i are shown in Appendix C. As in the previous Calderon et al. (2015) . Participants first pressed the start square. Subsequently, they were shown a letter conveying the probabilities associated with each upcoming reach possibility. R and r represent, respectively, 80%/60% and 20%/40% for right/left reach probabilities (similar logic applies to L and l). Participants then saw a fixation cross followed by the go signal indicating them where to reach for. Depicted on the figure are two congruent and incongruent trials. For congruent trials, the side with the highest probability to be reached was the same side indicated by the arrow go signal. This pattern was reversed for incongruent trials. Moreover, trials could either have a high (uppercase letter) or low (lowercase letter) probability of being congruent or incongruent. Hence, cue-target congruency could either be of high or low probability. The dashed trajectories on the figure represent the hypothesized trajectories under each condition. (B) Mapping used in Simulation 2. Each stimulus is connected to the PMd layer unit with a certain weight (see Appendix C for input-PMd weight values). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
simulation, one specific input (i.e., probability cue or go signal) unit was active at a time. Data analysis. Because we now also fit MTs, we fitted the UAM rather than the diffusion model. The fitting procedure as well as best fit parameters are displayed in the Appendix B. After data fitting, response times are expressed in ms rather than in arbitrary units; for these and all subsequent analyses, all simulated ITs under 100 ms are discarded from the analyses.
In a next step, to test model robustness, we calculated the coefficient of determination (R 2 ; see fitting procedure) between our simulated (400 trials) and empirical data for distinct combinations of parameter values (as in Verguts, Vassena, & Silvetti, 2015) . For the initial value of STN we took values ranging from 1.05 to 2 (steps of 0.1). For the decay parameter ␣, values ranged from 0.45 to 1.45 (steps of 0.05). Finally, for the encoding time ␣ we took values ranging from 47 to 57 (steps of 1). We then created R 2 heatmaps by fixing each combination of two parameters and averaging across all values of the third parameter (see model fit and robustness below).
Response implementation. In Calderon et al. (2015) , the IT was the time interval between the go signal onset and the moment when the vertical-dimension value of the online registered reach location crossed a certain level on the touchscreen, that is, the upper boundary of a start location square. MT was the time interval between crossing the upper boundary of the start location square and reaching the target location. Therefore, the ITs of the model were computed as the time interval between the input onset of the go signal and the moment that the vertical value of the movement (V; see Equation 1 above) vector was Ͼ1. To compute MTs, we calculated the time interval when the absolute values of the vector dimensions were respectively between 1 and 20 for the horizontal dimension, and between 1 and 50 for the vertical dimension. These values were chosen with respect to the target display in our previous study (i.e., the vertical reach distance reach was longer than the horizontal reach distance). To ensure that our simulated MPs end up at the same location, the reported MPs are normalized relative to their end point both for the lateral deviation (horizontal dimension) and reach distance (vertical dimension). Specifically, for all reaches, each data point on the two dimensions was divided by the maximal value on their respective dimension and multiplied by a constant (20 and 50 for the horizontal and vertical dimensions, respectively). Note that this manipulation does not distort the qualitative pattern of MPs.
Results
Initiation times. The result of our experimental manipulation on ITs is illustrated in Figure 4A . As can be seen, we first observed a congruency effect. Probability cues indicating the same side as the go signal (e.g., "R" followed by "Ͼ") yield faster ITs. Second, this congruency effect interacted with the level of probability (i.e., high or low). For congruent cue-target combinations, high probability cues induced faster ITs than low probability cues. This pattern reversed for incongruent cue-target combinations. Simulated ITs can be observed in Figure 5B . The UAM exhibits the same qualitative pattern as the empirical data (see below for model fit). We next assessed whether IT distributions would be similar to those of typical two-choice speeded button press tasks. Figure 5C shows the IT distribution of a representative participant from our empirical data set, displaying a typical, positively skewed distribution. As can be seen in Figure 4D , the IT distribution for a representative simulated participant is also positively skewed. Figures 5A and 5C . Empirical MTs displayed the same pattern as empirical ITs (see Figure 5A ). For congruent cue-target combinations, high probability cues induced faster MTs than low probability cues. This pattern reversed for incongruent cue-target combinations. Consistently, incongruent cue-target combinations elicited more curved MPs toward the competing target compared with congruent cue-target combinations. Furthermore, high probability incongruent cue-target combination MPs displayed the strongest curvature. Our model captures the qualitative pattern displayed by both the MTs and MPs (see Figure 5B and 5D, respectively).
Movement times and movement paths. The empirical MTs and MPs appear in
Model fit and robustness. The simulated ITs and MTs produced a very good fit (R 2 ϭ 0.997). To investigate model robustness to parameter setting, Figure 6 shows average R 2 heatmaps for different parameter settings (average is across the third parameter). Note that R 2 is consistently high across the entire grid. Hence, our model is robust to parameter setting, showing that the good fit is not due to parameter fitting, but rather to the model architecture.
Fixed decision bound emergence and task difficulty. The dynamical interaction between the STN activity and the absolute difference between M1 units is shown in Figure 7 . To avoid overload in the figure, we only plot activation of the task-required M1 units, but these approximate well the absolute difference between M1 units. Figure 7 shows the dynamical interaction for two congruent cue-target trials with different probabilities (operationalizing task difficulty: high probability ϭ easy, low probability ϭ difficult). High probability in favor of an action plan induces a steep increase in motor units (dark blue full line); hence the difference between motor units also increases fast. This induces a steep decrease in STN activation (dark blue dashed line). In contrast, a low probability in favor of an action plan induces a mild increase in motor units (light blue full line), hence a slower increase in difference between M1 units, and a slower decrease in STN activation (light blue dashed line). This explains the observation that distinct ITs are reached at a similar M1 activity level, also when varying difficulty level (Churchland et al., 2008; Schall & Bichot, 1998) . In other words, adaptive information flow exhibits a fixed decision bound as an emergent property, consistent with neurophysiological findings (e.g., Twomey et al., 2015) .
Simulation 3: Numerical Cognition
In the UAM, domain-specific cognitive processes (implemented as stimulus-response mappings) interact with domain-general decision making and motor processes. As a consequence, we can plug in the latter in any (domain-)specific task. With this in mind, we set out to apply our model to a very different domain, namely numerical cognition. In a number comparison task, Santens et al. (2011) instructed subjects to reach for a left (right) target when a number was smaller (larger) than five, or vice versa. The study investigated the numerical distance effect (e.g., Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2011) , meaning that ITs increase as distance between the compared number and the referent number increases. For instance, comparing one and five is typically faster than comparing four and five. Santens et al. (2011) found the empirical signature of the distance effect in ITs and This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
MTs. From the UAM point of view, however, comparison tasks are just another way to manipulate task difficulty. We thus tested whether our model could account for these data as well.
Method
Design. As in Santens et al. (2011) , numbers one to nine (except five) were presented to the model, to be compared with five. Also as in Santens et al. (2011) , the model reached as quickly as possible to a left-hand target if the number was smaller than five or to a right-hand target if it was larger than five (see Figure 8 ). ITs and MTs were computed as in Simulation 2; 4,000 trials were simulated with a similar trial distribution as in Santens et al. (2011) .
Data analysis. Exactly the same , ␣, and STN values as in Simulation 2 were used. Input to PMd is shown in Appendix C (values similar to Van Opstal, Gevers, De Moor, & Verguts, 2008) . As in Simulation 2, to evaluate model fit, the eight empirical ITs and MTs from Santens et al. (2011) were linearly regressed on the eight simulated ITs and MTs obtained from the model output.
Response implementation. Response implementation was identical to that of Simulation 2.
Results
The empirical results are illustrated in Figures 9A and 9C . The numerical distance effect is observed in the ITs ( Figure 9A ) and in the MTs ( Figure 9C ). Simulated ITs and MTs (again in arbitrary time units) appear in Figure 9B and 9D. As can be seen, our model exhibits the same qualitative pattern as the empirical data (also quantitatively the fit was excellent, R 2 ϭ 0.851). Importantly, the parameters were not optimized for this specific task; instead, we took the exact same values as in Simulation 2. Still, again our model captures the distance effect in ITs and in MTs, demonstrating its robustness. Hence, it shows in a completely different domain the UAM's capacity to account for the influence of cognitive processes on movement execution.
General Discussion
We presented the unfolding action model (UAM) of continuous cognition-action interactions. The UAM core concept is to propose a third level to information processing flow. The model implements continuous information flow from the first to the last cognitive stage, but adaptive information flow between the last cognitive and motor Calderon et al. (2015) . Graphical representation of the interaction between cue-target congruency and probability for ITs (i.e., the time interval between the go signal onset and leaving the start location square) in the experimental task. As can be observed, congruent trials are on average faster than incongruent trials. Moreover, for the congruent condition, high probable trials are faster than low probable trials, and this pattern reverses for the incongruent condition. (B) Similar for simulated ITs. (C) Initiation time probability density function (pdf) of a representative subject from Calderon et al. (2015) . As can be observed, the IT pdf of this subject is again positively skewed (␥ ϭ 0.79). (D) IT for one representative simulated subject also exhibits a positively skewed distribution (␥ ϭ 0.51). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
stage. In the UAM, adaptive information flow is gated by the subthalamic nucleus (STN). In Simulation 1, we demonstrate that our model can account for empirical patterns of the classical 2AFC decision making task, namely positively skewed RT distributions and speedaccuracy trade-offs. In Simulation 2, we addressed MTs and MPs in a cognitive control task. We demonstrated that thresholded information flow emerges between cognition and action (i.e., fixed decision bound). In line with empirical data, we showed that both the initiation time and online movement were sensitive to cognitive factors such as task difficulty (implemented as prime-target congruity). Furthermore, we showed that motor activity reached the same threshold level prior to response initiation regardless of task difficulty. In Simulation 3, a completely different task was considered (number comparison task in numerical cognition). Without any parameter change, we demonstrated that the simulations again corresponded closely to empirical ITs and MTs.
Anatomical Simplifications
The input and motor layers did not receive an anatomical label, simply because it is not entirely clear which region exactly would implement these functions. The input area may correspond to V1 and subsequent visual areas. The movement vector may be localized in either the spinal cord or the brainstem. Indeed, both are known to contain relatively high-order motor controllers (Swanson, 2012) . Of course, the spine additionally contains motor neurons (directly controlling flexor and extensor muscles), but this level of detail is beyond the scope of the current model. Consequently, we lumped every neuron outside cortex or basal ganglia as belonging to "motor stage." Movement in the UAM derives from a spatial averaging of the relevant movement vectors. There is direct evidence for such spatial averaging in motor cortex (Georgopoulos, Schwartz, & Kettner, 1986; Suminski, Mardoum, Lillicrap, & Hatsopoulos, 2015) . To our knowledge however, at the brainstem/spine level such averaging stands out for future research. Another simplification was the pathway from STN to motor cortex. Anatomically, STN excites globus pallidus pars interna and substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr); these areas inhibit thalamus. In turn, thalamus excites motor cortex, closing the motor-basal ganglia loop (Redgrave et al., 2010) . We also disregarded here the motor cortex basal ganglia direct and indirect This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
pathways via striatum. Recent tractography and fMRI work suggest that the anatomical pathway from pre-SMA to striatum may partly control the response inhibition threshold and thus the what/ when separation (Forstmann et al., 2008 (Forstmann et al., , 2010 . Such anatomical simplifications allowed us to focus on the model functional properties, but future research should tighten the link with the anatomy.
In the remainder of this article, we again revisit our core proposal, and while doing so discuss related models. Finally, we point to several avenues for future research.
Adaptive Information Flow
Our core proposal was to implement adaptive information flow between the last cognitive and motor stage. We here discuss some useful computational (what/when dissociation) and empirical (emergence of a fixed decision bound and temporal overlap between cognition and action) consequences of this concept. We also broaden it to other stages and discuss related proposals in the literature.
What/When Dissociation
Computational models of cognition typically do not separate what action to select from when to implement it. They implement behavioral execution as starting when motor activation crosses a fixed bound (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2007) . Of course, it is possible to prolong a model's response time (and thus increase the "when to respond") by simply adding a fixed encoding or motor constant (e.g., as in the DDM; Ratcliff, 1978) . Alternatively, one could increase the response threshold in order to delay the "when" to respond (Herz, Zavala, Bogacz, & Brown, 2016; Mansfield, Karayanidis, Jamadar, Heathcote, & Forstmann, 2011) . However, Figure 6 . Simulation 2, Model Robustness. The three heat maps depict the mean R 2 value when varying two parameters and averaging across all the levels of the third parameter. In figure A , B and C we respectively vary STN/Alpha, STN/Tau, Tau/Alpha and average across Tau, Alpha and STN. The black dot represents the parameters value used to generate the simulated data. The color bar indicates the correlation coefficient for the three graphs. Note that the lowest value equals 0.65. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
such a parametric modulation does not elucidate how or why the cognitive system can optimally choose the timing of response execution.
In the UAM, a what/when dissociation was achieved by creating a negative feedback loop between M1 and STN. In particular, when the system is uncertain about what action to perform, it withholds responding. Related what/when dissociations have been proposed in the literature, such as the basal ganglia model developed by Frank (2006; also see Frank, Samanta, Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007) . As in the UAM, the basal ganglia model dissociates what action to perform from when to execute it based on a negative feedback loop between (pre)motor cortex and STN. However, contrary to the UAM, the basal ganglia model does not implement adaptive information flow between the last cognitive stage and motor stage. Instead, it implements cognition-action thresholding. Therefore, the basal ganglia model cannot account for the influence of cognitive factors on overt movement execution.
We opted for response conflict as a convenient criterion for choosing when to withhold responding (as in Frank, 2006) . In general, we envision that the STN may learn when to withhold responding depending on task and contextual constraints. In particular, by using reinforcement learning principles, the STN may learn when to gate responses into the motor stage, and thus to optimally "decide" when to allow action execution (O'Reilly & Frank, 2006) . For example, consider again the cueing task of Simulation 2. When the proportion of incongruent trials is large, subjects tend to become more cautious. In the model, this could be implemented by strong excitatory weights from motor cortex to the STN, thus effectively letting subjects shift on the speed/accuracy continuum. By adaptively modifying the weights from M1 to STN, the UAM could learn what M1 activity pattern should modulate STN activity for optimal responding. Further note that any task, irrespective of its stimuli or even input modality, makes use of the same weights between M1 and STN. Therefore, the UAM predicts that response conservativeness obtained through learned M1-to-STN weights during a specific task, should generalize to tasks involving completely distinct stimuli. This remains to be tested.
Other models have suggested different mechanisms to address the what/when dissociation. For instance, a probabilistically motivated proposal appears in Bogacz and Gurney (2007) . These authors propose that the STN computes the normalization constant required to calculate the probability that a specific response is valid. When several options are equally likely (active), each option becomes less likely to pass the threshold, and the normalization This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
constant is large. This normalization constant can thus be thought of as representing response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001) , where a large (small) normalization constant is associated to high (low) response conflict. Thus, the normalization constant puts a dynamical brake on action initiation. Another model appeared in Niv, Daw, Joel, and Dayan (2007) . These authors propose that there is a cost to fast action implementation; very fast action onsets would entail a larger execution cost. In a reinforcement learning framework, they suggest that both what behavior to choose and when to do it, are decided by optimizing a joint reward/cost function. Lastly, a recent alternative account proposes that what/when dissociations are achieved through a process of time-varying optimal decision bounds (Malhotra, Leslie, Ludwig, & Bogacz, 2017) . Here, reaching or not reaching a decision bound is respectively reconceptualized as deciding to commit to a specific action or deciding instead to accumulate more evidence (i.e., wait before committing to an action). Malhotra, Leslie, Ludwig, and Bogacz (2017) suggest that committing or not to a specific action depends on the uncertainty regarding (the distribution of) trial difficulty.
Emergence of a Fixed Decision Threshold
As previously described, computational models typically implement cognition-action thresholding, that is, discrete step in the information flow between the last cognitive and motor stage. This implementation is also known as a fixed decision bound in accumulation-to-bound models (e.g., Ratcliff, 1978) . However, these models do not explain how this bound emerges from the interplay between the dynamical activity of distinct brain regions. In the UAM, decision bounds are not fixed but emerge from the dependency between motor cortices and STN activity, inducing an approximately linear decrease of the STN activity. This dependency approximates a fixed-bound model (see Figure 2C and 7) .
Not all models assume a fixed decision bound. Another important class of models propose that the evidence integration rate may be modified as a function of the urgency context (Cisek et al., 2009; Standage, You, Wang, & Dorris, 2011; Thura, BeauregardRacine, Fradet, & Cisek, 2012) . These models suggest that time pressure for the execution of a motor plan is integrated as a factor in the decision-making process. As the urgency to respond increases, so would the buildup rate of motor activity. For instance, the urgency-gating model (Cisek et al., 2009; Thura et al., 2012) accounts for action selection situations where temporal constraints play a significant role. In the urgency gating model, the rate of activity buildup is defined by the urgency parameter (typically proportional to elapsed time; Cisek et al., 2009) . Such an implementation can be reconceptualized as collapsing bounds to the decision process (for review see Hawkins, Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, & Brown, 2015) . In principle, the UAM can also approximate a collapsing bound model by letting STN activity decrease nonlinearly. Such a nonlinear decrease would be very naturally implemented by having STN receive other signals that can be integrated alongside signals from motor cortex (e.g., urgency signals; van Maanen, Fontanesi, Hawkins, & Forstmann, 2016) .
Temporal Overlap Between Cognitive and Motor Processes
By implementing adaptive information flow between the last cognitive and motor stage, an emergent property of the UAM appears, namely that cognitive effects leak into action. Any model This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
implementing cognition-action thresholding is unable to account for any influence of cognitive factors on movement execution. This is not problematic when accounting for discrete behavioral measures such a button presses. Indeed, button presses tend to hide the continuous effects of cognition on action. However, the advent of reaching task studies (Song & Nakayama, 2009 ) force scientists to develop models that can account for the typical behavioral patterns in button press studies, and simultaneously explain how cognitive factors influence overt execution. In the UAM, we show that adaptive information flow can bridge the gap between traditional button press models (Ratcliff, 1978) and novel data showing a continuous interaction between cognitive and motor processes (Calderon et al., 2017) . Finally, one might wonder what is adaptive about letting cognition "leak" into action, outside of providing cognitive scientists another dependent variable to model. We propose that this leak is a consequence of the what/when dissociation that the brain must implement for adaptive decision making. Neurally and behaviorally, due both to individual differences and noise at different processing stages, task performance sometimes may seem to either stem from overlapping or nonoverlapping cognitive and motor processes. Adaptive information flow can mimic both cases. Indeed, the system can potentially learn, by setting appropriate weights of the M1-STN projections, to behave within a continuum of fully overlapping (i.e., continuous information flow) or fully discrete (i.e., thresholded information flow) cognitive and motor processes. Take the case of an individual who shows little or no effect of cognitive factors on their overt movement execution. In the UAM, this would be accounted for by small M1-STN weights. Indeed, with small weights, the difference between competing M1 units will need to be large (i.e., conflict will be fully [or close to] resolved) for movement initiation to start. In turn, the effects of cognitive factors will influence the time it takes to initiate a movement rather than the movement itself (i.e., cognition will not leak into action). In contrast, envisage an individual showing a strong effect of cognitive factors on their actions. In this case, the UAM would account for such behavior by having large M1-STN weights. With large weights, the difference between competing M1 units will be small (i.e., conflict will not be resolved) when movement initiation starts. Hence, the effects of cognitive factors will not only have an influence on the time needed to initiate a movement but also on the movement itself (i.e., cognition will leak into action).
Output Gating
Theoretically, adaptive information flow can be implemented at distinct stages of information processing. Indeed, negative feedback loops can be implemented between distinct regions of the brain (i.e., processing stages) and basal ganglia nuclei (such as the STN). This proposal is called output gating (Chatham, Frank, & Badre, 2014; Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997; Kriete, Noelle, Cohen, & O'Reilly, 2013) . Output gating refers to holding information in working memory until the appropriate time for letting it go to subsequent stages has arrived. This is the same what/when dissociation as we discussed for the cognitive to motor gap, but applied to cognitive actions like "keeping information in working memory." Output gating models propose that learning when to gate information out of working memory is a separate subtask to be learned, obeying the same reinforcement learning principles as the overt task of learning what button to press. In such a system we can set, for each contiguous pair of stages, and even on a trial-bytrial basis, information flow on a continuum between continuous and thresholded. Thereby, one can imagine a system that has, for example, continuous information flow between Stages 1 and 2, but thresholded information flow between Stages 2 and 3. As already mentioned, future UAM work is planned to make the output gate dependent on reinforcement-based feedback.
Relation to Dynamic Field Theory
We considered just two points in the movement space for each task, each corresponding to a specific movement direction (movement vector). This was done because it allowed us to merge cognitive movement data (Simulations 1-3) more easily with the biology of movement and inhibition. Future work should extend our framework toward more continuous movements (Christopoulos, Bonaiuto, & Andersen, 2015) . This extension can be implemented by using dynamic neural fields (Cisek, 2006; Klaes, Schneegans, Schöner, & Gail, 2012) . Here, movement is considered as a point in a multidimensional space, where each dimension represents a movement characteristic such as direction, speed, or vigor. Movement is constrained by activation from motor, memory, and cognitive layers (Erlhagen & Schöner, 2002; Schöner & Thelen, 2006) . These neural fields describe the activation distributions over the movement vector feature space (e.g., Erlhagen, Bastian, Jancke, Riehle, & Schöner, 1999) . Such a move would allow us to extend our model and account for more naturalistic reaches in a three-dimensional space (e.g., Chapman et al., 2010; Gallivan & Chapman, 2014) .
Broadening the UAM Task Scope
The current model allows consideration of many more tasks and contexts than just those reported here. A first example would be the go/no-go task (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007) . As just mentioned, in the applications considered up to now, movement resulted from two fixed vectors (pointing left and right, respectively). However, in the context of the go/no-go task, it is straightforward to envisage that the STN itself competes against movement toward a specific button. Indeed, a strongly supported possibility is that the right inferior frontal cortex feeds a response inhibition signal to the STN, thereby biasing the competition in favor of the STN (for review see Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014) . Hence, this response inhibition would make sure that the adaptive information flow gate remains closed and action is withheld.
A second task, namely the stop-signal task (Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984) , could be modeled in a very similar fashion. This task has been modeled extensively as an independent race between one or more responses and the stop response (e.g., Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014 ). In the current framework, a stop task would be implemented by adding another excitatory input to the STN (for instance from striatal no-go neurons, see Collins & Frank, 2013) . This input would activate STN and thus exhibit an opposite effect as M1 units. In turn STN activation would maintain the adaptive information flow gate closed. In line with this view, recent work suggests that successful motor inhibition results from stop-cue This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
related information being transmitted from the striatum, through the globus pallidus, to the STN (Schmidt, Leventhal, Mallet, Chen, & Berke, 2013) . Third, a natural application for our model is the "reach/point to X" task, where movement paths can be measured (e.g., Sullivan et al., 2015) . An instance of this paradigm is the "point to number" task (Dotan & Dehaene, 2016; Siegler & Opfer, 2003) , where a subject is required to point on a physical line to where the corresponding number would be situated on a number line. By modeling movement time and paths, in addition to response time to choices, our model can address "reach/point to X" tasks that investigate the temporal dynamics of action selection processes (Boulenger et al., 2006; Cressman et al., 2007; McKinstry, Dale, & Spivey, 2008; Resulaj et al., 2009; Spivey et al., 2005) .
Conclusion
We proposed a neurocomputational model based on the theoretical framework of integrative information processing suggesting a parallel implementation of perceptual, cognitive, and motor processes (Cisek, 2007; Friston, 2010; Gibson, 1979) . Modeling behavior as a continuous cognition-action interaction refereed by the dynamic interplay between the basal ganglia (McHaffie, Stanford, Stein, Coizet, & Redgrave, 2005) , in particular the STN (Frank, 2006) , and sensorimotor cortices (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010) , accounts for many empirical effects of cognition on action initiation and execution (Calderon et al., 2015) . It also explains ubiquitous behavioral and neurophysiological patterns (i.e., positive skew, speed-accuracy trade-off, emergence of a fixed decision threshold). Perhaps more importantly, the model opens doors for future research on interactions between neurophysiology, cognition, and action dynamics.
Model Optimization Procedure
Three parameters were optimized to best fit the empirical data, namely the initial value of STN, the encoding time and decay factor ␣. Best fit parameters were obtained through a "zoom lens" stepwise grid search over the parameter space. We first performed a grid search with a rather large step between parameters values. Once this procedure found a parameter set yielding the highest coefficient of determination between simulated and empirical data, we reproduced the grid search with smaller steps (same number as the prior search) around the previously found parameter values, and so on until best fit parameters were obtained. The coefficient of determination value stemmed from linearly regressing the eight empirical ITs and MTs from Calderon et al. (2015) on the eight simulated ITs and MTs obtained with every combination of the three parameters (see above). Parameters were optimized in Simulation 2, and then reused in Simulation 3.
Simulation 1 assessed the effect of modifying the STN initial value. The data in Simulation 1 were therefore produced with a low and high initial STN value. Appendix B shows the parameter values for Simulation 1, 2, and 3. Furthermore, Appendix C displays the input-to-PMd connection weights in each simulation. 
Appendix B Parameters Value for Each Simulation

